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INTRODUCTION

One summer evening in August 1991, a Jewish driver struck two
black children in the Crown Heights area of Brooklyn, New York,
sparking an incident that exposed the raw underbelly of racial and
ethnic tension in parts of America.' In the fracas that followed, an orthodox Jewish man was stabbed by a black man, Lemrick Nelson, Jr.
Nelson was apprehended and tried in a New York State court for second-degree murder, among other charges. The jury acquitted Nelson
of all charges in July 1992.2
Later, both Nelson and Charles Price, another black man involved in the melee, were charged in federal district court under a hate
crimes statute for attacking Yankel Rosenbaum.3 This incident, com"J.S.D. Candidate
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1. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 145 (2002).
The following summary of the events in the case follows Judge Calabresi's account of the facts in
the opinion. Both of the children were seriously injured in the crash; one of them later died from
the wounds. In the turmoil and commotion that followed, a black man named Charles Price began to address the assembled crowd, in "angry and aggressive" words decrying the unfairness of
the treatment given to the Jewish driver in comparison to the two more seriously injured black
children, and shouting out statements like, "Let's get the Jews" and "Eye for an eye. No justice
no peace." Members of the crowd began to shout back, "Get the Jews." The restive crowd soon
transmogrified into a violent, angry mob, "an explosive mass." The group attacked a Jewish
couple, assaulted another Jewish man, and to shouts of "get the Jew, kill the Jew," finally chased
down a bearded Jewish man, Yankel Rosenbaum, threw him to the ground and beat him repeatedly. Police appeared, and while most of his assailants scattered, Rosenbaum allegedly grabbed
one of them, Lemrick Nelson, Jr., by the shirt and held him back. After trying to get out of
Rosenbaum's grasp, Nelson finally pulled out a knife, stabbed him and ran off. Rosenbaum later
died from the stab wounds.
2. Id. at 171.
3. Id.
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bined with the state court acquittal, generated considerable tension
and political controversy over the case. The federal district judge
quickly declared, in the early proceedings of the ensuing trial, that he
sought to empanel "a moral jury that renders a verdict that has moral
integrity."'4 In this regard, the district judge made some unusual decisions regarding jury selection, apparently in an effort to correct an imbalance caused by the disproportionate number of blacks in comparison to Jews on the panel. For instance, the judge denied a challenge
for cause by the defense with respect to a Jewish juror who had expressed serious doubts about his ability to be fair and impartial in the
case. In addition, the judge filled a gap created by an excusal by removing another juror from the panel and including a Jewish juror,
along with a black juror, both of whom were selected out of the order
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defense
consented to the judge's reshuffling of the jury panel. At the conclusion of the trial, both defendants were convicted.' The Second Circuit
reversed, citing the district court's violation of the Equal Protection
Clause in its failure to carry out the jury selection process in a raceneutral manner.6
This case presents many elements of a persistent problem confronting courts as they attempt to maneuver between impartiality and
fair cross-representation. In his zeal for seating a jury that could render a verdict with "moral integrity," the New York district judge succumbed to a temptation to which many courts have not been immune,
placing such value upon a sense of balance as to go off the constitutional rails in a fruitless quest for subjective impartiality.
The first section of this Article will introduce the dynamics of
the relationship between two competing visions of impartiality as it
has played out in the opinions of federal and state courts, including
secondary sources. I call the two approaches "modernist" and "postmodernist" and examine the arguments that have sought to broaden
the scope of the fair cross-section requirement in the name of the latter
view, a perspective similar to that motivating the district judge in the
Crown Heights case. Part II identifies the Supreme Court's opening
gestures in the direction of the "post-modernist" model. Part III carries the development forward, presenting the problems and tensions
that have resulted in an uneasy and pragmatic accommodation between the older modernist model and its would-be post-modernist
4. Id.
5. Id. at 171-72.
6. Id. at 213.
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successor. This accommodation can be seen most plainly in the interplay of opposing theoretical and practical considerations that inform
the jury selection process at two discrete points in time: an early (venire) and late stage (peremptory challenges) of the process. Parts IV
and V will pause to examine one particular manifestation of what I
designate the post-modern vision of jury selection; one ironically with
roots in an ancient historical tradition that attempts to secure more
solid theoretical foundations for community participation in juries.
These efforts certainly do not lack good intentions. Moreover, the
post-modernist critique provides some important insights into the inadequacies of the pure modernist paradigm. Still, it is my conclusion
that moving in the direction of a more overtly post-modern model
would be ill founded and could ultimately prove destructive, rather
than restorative, for the institution of the jury and for civil society in
general.
Just as the Second Circuit ruled in the Crown Heights case, the
ills that "jury-mandering" seeks to resolve-whether in the name of
identity politics, a post-modern desire to "balance the biases," or as an
artificial mechanism for creating a more inclusive sense of community-the real deleterious effects of such attempts simply outweigh the
putative benefits. This Article suggests in the concluding section that
while further work needs to be done to identify a coherent epistemological account of juror knowledge, the judiciary's navigation of the
constitutional requirements of fairness and impartiality, along with
equal protection, remains perhaps the best that can be done under the
current circumstances.
I. Two MODELS OF JUROR KNOWLEDGE
The contemporary model that the "subjective impartiality" approach seeks to supplant, the "blank slate" ideal, competes with a
model in which juror competence is viewed in terms of the individual's status as neighbor and peer, where abstract and absolute neutrality was not the goal; rather, a peculiar kind of "local knowledge" was
considered more reliable and effective toward the achievement of justice.7 Court opinions dealing with issues regarding jury selection reflect these competing versions of epistemological perspective, alternating between models reliant upon the modernistic conception of
knowing based in a form of Lockean empiricism, to a "postmodernist" acquiescence in the impossibility of true impartiality,
7. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 17-55 (1994).
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which speaks profoundly about the nature of the deliberative function
of juries in contemporary society. Thus, in the Lockean "modernist"
model, the ideal "tabula rasa of the impartial juror" shapes the investigative, deliberative process of the trial:
The entire effort of our [trial] procedure is to secure ... jurors
who do not know and are not in a position to know anything of
either [the] character [of the parties] or events [on trial] ....
The zeal displayed in this effort to empty the minds of the jurors ... [is a sign] that the jury .... like the court itself, is an
impartial organ of justice.'
In the microcosm of the criminal trial, it is the experience of facts
as they develop in the course of trial that brings the knowledge necessary to the achievement of an effective deliberative process. Ideally,
the phenomena of the trial, as well as the reflective process of deliberation-comparing and evaluating the myriad sense experiences accumulated throughout the course of the trial-constitute the legitimate
sources of juror knowledge. Rather than forfeit neutrality by operating on the basis of externally obtained information, the juror's level of
knowledge rises or falls according to the level of "experience" she accumulates within the microcosm of the trial.
Yet, in the pluralistic, post-modern world of the contemporary
criminal jury trial, a more potent form of "tacit knowledge" is frequently recognized. Here, the limits of appropriate juror knowledge
may be set according to categories assigned by identity politics. If juries are said to bring along residual cognitive baggage, it is with respect to their status as members of certain exclusive groups, according
to an ideology of difference that strikes noetic barriers along lines of
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or even sexual preference.9 Courts
have strained to secure the inclusion of members of such disparate
groups to ensure a truly representational cross-section of the community. ' ° It is said that the unique knowledge such individuals bring due
to their identification with and experience as members of such diverse
groups allows for the "conscience of the community" to emerge in the
course of the jury's deliberative process." Thus, many courts are
8. Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 458 (D.N.J. 1937), affd, 103
F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939)) (alterations in original).
9. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (West. 2003).
10. See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer Or Cure? A ContemporaryReview Of
Affirmative Action Injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707 (1993).
11. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 9-11 (1983) ("increasing the representativeness of a jury panel, at least in a heterogeneous community, tends to increase the variety of
viewpoints represented on the panel. Increasing the variety of views, thereby producing a coun-
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coming to consider this kind of intuitive knowledge to be a good thing,
while the older notion of local knowledge-any extrinsically derived
information about the case at hand, is an evil to be avoided, and the
possibility of the kind of abstract neutrality represented above as the
"modernist" model-is declared to be virtually non-existent.
While the motivations behind these innovations are well intentioned (i.e., inclusion of diverse, historically underrepresented groups;
eradication of invidious forms of discrimination; and maximization of
community participation in an important democratic function), there
is a concomitant price that is infrequently addressed. The price comes
indirectly, in terms of the public perception of the jury as an institution. The judicial ambivalence about the value to be placed on the
types of knowledge and experience jurors bring into the courtroom,
including the courts' inconsistency in setting the asymptotes to which
jurors and the process for obtaining them are to approximate, has led
to a profoundly unsettling confusion that has shaken the integrity of
the institution itself. Moreover, the preoccupation with sending the
right signals about gender, race, and other categories of identity politics has spawned new complexities in what has been called "an increasingly Byzantine system of justice that devotes more and more of
its energy to sideshows and less and less to the merits of the case." 12

II. A CHANGE IN Focus: TAYLOR'S FAIR CROSS REPRESENTATION
PRINCIPLE

Culminating a long, gradual shift of direction, the Supreme
Court declared Louisiana's jury-selection system unconstitutional in
Taylor v. Louisiana13 because its system excluded women from jury
service. Thus, the Court decided, the presence of a fair cross-section
of the community on venires, panels, or lists from which petit juries
are drawn is essential to the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.14
The Court isolated and fixed its attention on the intuitive knowledge
that jurors bring in to the courtroom, irrespective of their ignorance of
the facts of the particular case at hand; here, the way of knowing and
terbalancing of biases, is likely to affect fact finding. Individuals from a variety of backgrounds
are likely to attend to and remember different aspects of the trial evidence, making the jury as a
whole remember the total pattern of evidence more completely. A similar argument can be made
for the generation of reasonable inferences and the evaluation of witness credibility. A variety of
viewpoints expressed during deliberation may also improve the individual juror's application of
the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof. Finally, all of these factors taken together are
likely to affect the jury's verdict.").
12. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

13. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
14. Id. at 538.
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understanding that comes with sexual identity. Citing its decision in
Ballard v. United States,"5 the Court averred that "a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would
be true if an economic or racial group were excluded."' 6 This seems to
lead to the conclusion that any jury without a proportional mix of men
and women would be missing the unique "flavor" and "distinct quality" that the Court deemed essential to the fair cross section requirement. Yet, the Court insisted that it was imposing "no requirement
that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population."" "Defendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. '"18 Despite its
overt move toward the "post-modern" orientation, the Court seemed
to be taking away with the left hand what it had just given with the
right. Presumably, the Court saw that imposing its "flavor and distinctness" requirement on the composition of each particular jury
panel in the nation would prove to be an unmanageable burden.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed to the dangers involved in
constitutionalizing a group identity-based standard of jury selection.
If the goal was to add a higher degree of flavor and distinctness into
the jury mix, consistency required an acknowledgment of the fact that
"doctors, lawyers, and other groups, whose frequent exemption from
jury service is endorsed by the majority, also offer qualities as distinct
and important as those at issue here."' 9 The dissent raised the issue as
to whether the court was establishing an arbitrary standard based in
mere "mysticism" that conflicted with established precedents by setting the constitutional bar for jury selection in terms of group identity.
By adjusting to the terms of its flexible fair-cross-section principle, the Taylor Court ironically ran the risk of promoting a shrinkage
of the political purposes inherent in the notion of jury service as sublimation of individual identity and interest in the service of a broader
common good. It did so through its insistence on constitutionalizing
the chemical breakdown of jury composition in terms of group identity. The fair-cross-section principle now functioned as the guarantor
of fairness and even neutrality. The achievement of fairness was now
tied, not to the objective neutrality of jurors, but, ostensibly, to the
chemical balance of a given jury panel's subjective understandings that
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

329 U.S. 187 (1946).
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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would result from a proper application of the fair-cross-section principle. As the dissent noted, the focus was no longer upon securing unbiased and impartial juries, but on achieving the proper cross-sectional
representation, a target which was constantly moving. "Communities
differ at different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one
time or place is not
necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a
20
different place.Constitutional analysis of the jury selection process was now
hitched to the time-dependent and culturally-determined function of
the fair-cross-section principle. The Taylor Court set a pattern, a
model, by which lower courts and eventually the public at large were
in the future to gauge the ways in which they conceptualized the process of jury selection and decision-making. The Court's decision promoted a realignment of priorities at the level of constitutional theory
and practice. To be sure, the notion of a unified, complementary jury
composed of diverse elements is a common understanding of the nature and purpose of the jury. But here, the element of unity seemed to
be shifting out of focus. Because the various groups differed so profoundly, it was constitutionally essential to secure a "place at the table" to all such groups in order to ensure the jury's decisions would
truly reflect the consensus of the political community.
No doubt, the Court's intentions were laudable. Yet, the unanswered question ticking away beneath the surface concerned just how
the institution of the jury could maintain the voice of unity at the very
moment that such unity was being called into question at the deeper
epistemological level. Heeding the shifting tectonic plates of historically determined conceptions of political community, the Court developed its conceptual reconfiguration of the jury as a fragmentary mix of
disparate voting blocks. In his review of the cases, Professor Jeffrey
Abramson has observed:
The ideal of the cross-sectional jury rejects [the] common-law
view of impartial deliberation. It sees individual jurors as inevitably the bearers of the diverse perspectives and interests of their
race, religion, gender, and ethnic background. Deliberations are
considered impartial, therefore, when group differences are not
eliminated but rather invited, embraced, and fairly represented.
To eliminate potential jurors on the grounds that they will bring
the biases of their group into the jury room is, we are told, to
misunderstand the democratic task of the jury, which is nothing
else than to represent accurately the diversity of views held in a
20. Id. at 537.
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heterogeneous society such as the United States. If the jury is
balanced to accomplish this representative task, then as a whole
it will be impartial, even though no one juror is. The jury will
from
achieve the "overall" or "diffused" impartiality that comes
21
balancing the biases of its members against each other.
The adoption-indeed, institutionalization--of such groupbased notions of juror self-understanding represents a momentous
shift in the fundamental conception of jury service as a means of democratic participation. Where the average citizenry's engagement in
the associational life of civil society approaches the vanishing point,
where "everything private ...

becomes grist for the public mill" and

"everything public... is privatized and played out in a psychodrama
on a grand scale," the jury becomes one more staging point for what
political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain calls a "politics of displacement. ,22 Because juries represent one of the few ongoing institutional venues for public, deliberative, and democratic engagement, the
prospect of a co-opting of the jury institution by a "politics of displacement" is a portentous development. The "politics of displacement" is Elshtain's phrase for a situation in which "private identity
takes precedence over public ends or purposes; indeed, one's private
identity becomes who and what one is in public, and public life is
about confirming that identity. ' 23 The civic responsibilities of jury
service run the risk of becoming submerged in a wash of identity politics, where "[t]here is no broader identification with a common good
beyond that of the group of which one is a member."2 4

III. PRAGMATIC ACCOMMODATION: THE BEST THAT CAN BE
DONE?

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's protestations to the contrary, another consequence of post-modern "subjective impartiality" is
that the delicate "balance of biases" is stillborn whenever the makeup
of an individual jury panel fails to provide the requisite sampling of
diverse groups-regardless of the proportionally representative quality
of the jury pool from which it is originally selected. The logic of
cross-representation drives towards fulfillment at the level of the individual jury; one of the most insistent claims in favor of the crossrepresentation principle proceeds from the sensible observation that
21. ABRAMSON, supranote 7, at 101-02 (citation omitted).
22. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 37-38(1995).

23. Id. at 52-53 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 58.
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the perception of fairness and impartiality is often as important as the
reality.
In an influential article published a few years before the Taylor v.
Louisiana decision, John Hart Ely addressed the question whether
there should be an affirmative requirement for states to secure proportional minority group representation on each panel according to their
representation in the entire population.2" He singled out the example
of jury selection in discussing legislative and administrative motivation in constitutional law because he believed it to be a paradigmatic
case for examining the reasons underlying the Court's hesitation to
impose positive obligations on states in the name of equality:
[I]f the imposition of such an affirmative obligation is ever appropriate, it surely is appropriate in the jury selection context.
The harm which accrues to a litigant from the underrepresentation of his race on the jury which sits in judgment on him is exactly the same whether the underrepresentation was achieved intentionally or unintentionally. No argument can be made, as it
can in the districting situation, that a degree of racial imbalance
serves a desirable political function. And a standard for policing
the obligation to seek a balance readily suggests itself: the state
could be obligated to make the racial composition of the panel
conform as closely as possible to the most recent census figures
for the area from which the jury is drawn. 26
The same argument could be made, of course, for achieving proportionality in terms of gender, ethnicity, national origin, or religion to
name a few other prominent categories of group identity. Yet, the
Court has not ventured this far in the direction of its cross-section
principle in the intervening years since Ely wrote and since the Taylor
v. Louisiana decision. Rather, it has attempted to steer a middle
course with its Batson27 test, for instance, to invalidate wrongly motivated peremptory challenges. Once members of a racial minority
make it on the venire, they can only be challenged off the panel for a
race-neutral reason. Attempts at "gerrymandering" the panel on the
25. John Hart Ely, Legislative And Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L. J. 1205 (1970).

26. Id. at 1257. If this was true thirty years ago when Ely wrote, the number of such categories of group identity seem only to have multiplied since. Witness the concomitant proliferation of political interest groups that have organized and located in Washington since 1970. Kay
Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, More of the Same: Washington PressureGroup Activity
in a Decade of Change, 45 JOURNAL OF POLITIcS 351, 355 (1983). This is not to say that such
groups did not exist prior to 1970, but it is to suggest that the awareness of their identity as political entities with distinct interests has considerably heightened.
27. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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basis of race or gender by either the prosecution or defense have been
declared off limits. The Batson framework has resulted in a fury of
critical commentary that is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate.28 What is clear is that the Court continues to refrain from going
to the length of requiring proportionally representative cross-sections
on each jury panel, whether in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, or any
other category. It appears that the Court's reasons for refusing to follow its representative cross-section principle to its logical conclusion
have not changed.
Since Taylor, efforts have been made at different levels to expand
the scope of the fair-cross-representation principle to include other
categories beyond gender and race. Thus, religion, ethnicity, social
status, and sexual orientation have been discussed or implemented.
Indeed, the initiatives represented by these examples point to a rather
gaping flaw in the current framework. One argument for requiring racial or gender balance on jury panels arises from the fact that ours is a
system that seeks to administer justice according to the facts of the individual case. At least in the serious criminal case, we do not pare the
facts down to a basic formula, insert them into a computer, and determine appropriate findings and sentence according to the general
formula. Rather, because we are dealing with the infinite complexities
and variety of human experience, the intent is to ensure a process by
which justice is meted out on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, in the right set of facts, say, a crime committed by a
West Indian black man against an African-American black woman,
(the relationship between the two groups has long been marked by
"[sleparation, hostility, and conflict"29 ) the requirement of fair-crossrepresentation would arguably require more than just a proportional
mix of blacks and whites on the jury panel. Even an all-black panel
would probably not be satisfactory. It is not just that factors such as
race, gender, religion, and politics "are too numerous, and they over28. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Deborah L. Forman,
What Difference Does it Mase? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1992);
Alan Raphael, DiscriminatoryJury Selection: Lower'Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky,
25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293 (1989); Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaireand the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
981 (1996); Jos6 Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the
Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343 (1998); Andrew G. Gordon,
Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule ProhibitingRacial Discrimination in
Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 685 (1993); David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky
and the ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge:Arbitrary and CapriciousEqual Protection?, 74 VA. L.
REV. 811 (1988).
29. THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 219 (1981).
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lap in too many combinations, to permit perfectly proportional representation. '3' Rather, the example demonstrates that current lines of
demarcation-by which the large-block categories of race and gender
are factors that must be considered for purposes of meeting the faircross-section principle while more subtle, but potentially more relevant, distinctions are not-rest on boundaries that are rather roughcut, if not downright arbitrary, given the fact that we seek to provide
justice in the individual case.
If we are not to abandon our dedication to the principle of
subjective impartiality, by which we require a jury selection process
that-going beyond the objective, reasonable third-party observerseeks to satisfy, at least in part, the subjective expectations for "impartiality" of the criminal defendant, why not seek to include a suitably
proportionate number of obese persons in jury pools for trials involving an obese accused? Or the poor, mutatis mutandis, in the relevant
case? Certainly it is not unthinkable that a more coherent rationale exists for differentiation along lines of economic status than ethnicity,
gender or race.3 1
However, courts have rejected such claims,32 citing the lack of
differentiating qualities that would identify, e.g., the poor as a distinct
community of interest that is relatively fixed and unchanging over
time. The suggestion of such new, as yet unrecognized groupings, is
not meant to disparage the undeniable fact that existing "intergroup
differences are real, large, and enduring-whether these groups differ
racially, culturally, or in other ways."33 Yet, surely the West Indian/African-American case calls into question the efficacy of accepted juridical principles of distinction as applied to a single subcategory, the black race.
The expansion of the "fair-cross-section" takes on a different
meaning, one tinged with irony, in the context of Batson peremptory
challenge issues. Here, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to recognize the right of criminal defendants to bring the complaints of jurors excused peremptorily on the basis of race, even where race has no
demonstrable relevance to the given case. Thus, if a purported equal
protection violation occurs to jurors at the defendant's trial, i.e., if
30. Ely, supra note 26, at 1258.
31. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in RaceConscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1994) (arguing that "categories of race and ethnicity are analytically 'slippery' in a way that indicia of income... are not.").
32. See United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973), affd sub nom.
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975).
33. THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE 143 (1983).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 26:445

black jurors are peremptorily and inexplicably removed from the panel
that is to sit in judgment of a white defendant, the defendant, though a
convicted murderer, is set free.3 4 In this way, the Supreme Court has
gone out of its way to provide no quarter to racial discrimination, even
where there has been no demonstration of concrete harm to the defendant.
It seems obvious that the Court has moved far beyond Professor
Ely's concern for minority defendants whose race is underrepresented
on the jury panel. In McCollum, it reached "the remarkable conclusion that criminal defendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection"3 5 and that Batson controls the discriminatory
challenges of defendants as well as prosecutors. The Court makes
these remarkable innovations in the name of a juror's right not to be
excluded from a petit jury panel on account of race36 and protects jurors by an ironically zealous adherence to the "modernist" model of
impartiality.
This is a point I will be addressing again at a later stage. The
irony here is that the Court, in the name of securing a contextualized
mix on jury panels, does so by treating the issue of racial discrimination as an "objective," almost doctrinaire abstraction, without apparent regard for the context of the cases in which it makes such pronouncements.
Yet, if it is important to maintain the cross-sectional flavor by
impaneling representatives of groups that are in no way implicated by
the facts of a given case, (Powers), or when it runs against the interest
of the criminal defendant to do so, (McCollum), then, a fortiori, it
would seem that the presence of members of groups with a more direct
and pertinent connection to the issues of the case should be allowed to
remain as well-e.g., the obese defendant mentioned above. Decisions
like Powers and McCollum, symbolic for their gestures of intolerance
of racial discrimination, seem to be gratuitous or even arbitrary, because they set limits on the parties' ability to control the make-up of
the jury without regard to the impact or even the relevance of such de34. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
35. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. Powers, 499 U.S. at 400. Justice Thomas concurred in the result in McCollum because
he believed the court ought to be bound by the precedent in Edmonson but nevertheless pronounced: "In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the
criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or
even death. At a minimum, I think that this inversion of priorities should give us pause."
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62.
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cisions to the actual case. Meanwhile, the interest of the defendant in
having a jury that contains a true cross-sectional mix may only be addressed in very rough and potentially inadequate categories, at one
stage of removal from the actual composition of the jury itself. It is
hardly a surprise that such a settlement remains unsatisfactory to
many.
The experience of California is illustrative. Since a California
Supreme Court decision held discrimination in jury selection could
not be directed against any "identifiable group distinguished on racial,
religious, ethnic or similar grounds," the orbit of "cognizable groups"
has steadily expanded. 7 For example, in a later opinion, the Court
proceeded to elaborate a two-part test by which the criterion of "identifiability" could be assessed: a group's members "must share a common perspective arising from their life experience in the group[;]"
moreover, "no other members of the community are capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group assertedly excluded.""3 Such a definition leaves it wide open.
In its articulation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
Wheeler Court emphasized that "the only practical way to achieve an
overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of a variety of
such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members,
to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other
out." 9 Though this language may have been no more than a flourish
of gratuitous hyperbole, it still arrests the reader with the forcefulness
of its "subjective impartiality" component, for the California court
seems to be denying even the possibility of objectivity, resting instead
on the "cancellation" effect wrought by a balance of biases. Since
these cases were decided, the California legislature has included in its
Code of Criminal Procedure the categories of occupation, race, color,
religion, sex, national origin and economic status as classifications for
which potential jurors may not be exempted from jury service. The
statute has recently been amended to include the gay community.4"
The point of this history is not to call into question the wisdom
of California's choices as to cognizable categories but rather to proceed
along the asymptotes of Supreme Court rhetoric on the subject of impartiality and the fair-cross-section principle. The California illustration shows the logical outworkings of these concepts and the direction
37.
38.
39.
40.

People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 760 (Cal. 1978).
Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (Cal. 1979).
Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 755.
See CAL.CRIM.PROC. CODE 204 (West Supp. 2001), amended by Ch. 43.
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they might take in the future."' It also demonstrates the apparent arbitrariness of the barriers erected at the federal level between recognized
and unrecognized groups. California seems to be showing a greater
consistency in its interpretation of the fair-cross-section standard,
given the emphasis on subjective impartiality that has formed the
background of judicial discussions of the principle since Taylor.
The decisions also demonstrate the danger into which the old
"modernist" notion of objective impartiality is prone to fall. The expansion of protected classifications in all directions necessitates a corresponding finding as to the impossibility of locating anyone who can
be said to be neutral. Once expansion begins to take place, it becomes
very difficult as a matter of logic to set principled limits on such expansion. If it is true that "the only practical way to achieve an overall
impartiality"4 2 is to ensure the representation of a sufficient number of
conflicting groups so that the biases represented there will cancel one
another out, it remains to be asked, what more pertinent bias could exist than that represented by the perspective of the criminal defendant
himself? Thus, the group membership identified by the criminal defendant, that of, say, obese persons or the poor or those opposed to the
death penalty, should by all rights have a voice on the jury panel.
Does not acquiescence in a situation in which the only biases that are
consciously allowed an airing during jury deliberations represent concerns and perspectives irrelevant or merely tangential to the given facts
of the case at hand, in effect perpetuate the myth that the Emperor has
clothes? Are we actually allowing ourselves to be satisfied with a jury
that is not truly impartial at all-given our definition of impartialitybecause we are allowing potentially hugely significant sources of bias
to go unquestioned and unchallenged? Of course we are-given this
definition of impartiality.
All of these concerns used to be addressed by means of the peremptory challenge. But the peremptory challenge has fallen on hard
times of late," with a growing number of voices calling for its outright

41. For a brief survey of the approaches taken in other states, see Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1661-64 (1985). "Only New Mexico has followed California in ruling that the state constitution prohibits the use of peremptory
challenges to eliminate any cognizable group." Id. at 1662 (emphasis in original).
42. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 755.
43. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) ("If the goal of the Sixth Amendment is
representation of a fair cross section of the community on the petit jury, then intentionally using
peremptory challenges to exclude any identifiable group should be impermissible-which would,
as we said in Lockhart, 'likely require the elimination of peremptory challenges."' (citation omitted)).
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abolition" ever since the suggestion was first given prominence in Justice Marshall's concurrence in the Batson case. The peremptory challenge, as Justice Scalia particularly has been wont to remind,4" exists to
give the task of sorting out the biases most relevant in the given case to
those most competent of determining it, i.e., the parties, and to give
the parties a degree of flexibility and control over the constitution of
the jury panel through their implementation of the challenge mechanism.46 Yet, as the number of protected categories of cognizable
groups expands-and how could it help but expand, given the courts'
methods and definitions for identifying such groups-the parties' ability to control for perceived biases shrivels. Fewer people can be challenged peremptorily because ever greater swathes of the population
will be protected by their inclusion in cognizable groups whose continued presence is necessary to maintain the "balance of bias."
As we have seen in the peremptory challenge cases in the line of
Batson, the discussion reverts to the "modernist" rhetoric of rationality
and objectivity.4 7 Such challenges for bias are met with the rebuke
that they perpetuate irrational discrimination and cannot be legitimate. This occurs because the parties' apprehension of bias runs into
the other "modernist" definition of impartiality-i.e., that which presumes jurors to be bloodless "blank slates"-reinvigorated to prevent
the outright slide into pure subjectivity which would be precipitated
by its abandonment.
Thus, the two theories of impartiality sit in an uneasy equilibrium, the fair-cross-section's "post-modernist" version operating up
to the venire stage, and the "modernist" objective standard kicking in
44. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Morris B.
Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CI. L.
REV . 809 (1997).
45. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 474; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 70 (1992)
(Justice Scalia's dissent observed that some attempt to "use the Constitution to destroy the agesold right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure a jury
that they consider fair").
46. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (discussing function and necessity of the
peremptory challenge). See also Abbe Smith, "Nice Work if You Can Get it": "Ethical"Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1998).
47. Thus, in Powers, the court rejected the suggestion "that no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the raw fact of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). The court confidently stepped
into the shoes of the "wronged" juror to respond: "[w]e do not believe a victim of the classification would endorse this view; the assumption that no stigma or dishonor attaches contravenes
accepted equal protection principles. Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or
competence." Id. at 410.
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when the time comes for peremptory challenges- McCollum and
Powers squared off against Holland. Of course, nobody seems to be
very pleased with such an arrangement. Empirical evidence that
would support the "bias balance" theory of impartiality is thin on the
ground and inconclusive at best. 4' The stronger current may seem to
be coming from the direction of the "post-modernist" camp, as the
scope of the peremptory challenge continues to dwindle. Yet, the
counter-poise maintained between the two opposing theoretical strains
maintains this virtue: it avoids the extremes on either side. Judging by
the lines of division in the Supreme Court, it does not appear this development could be the result of a conscious, systematic jurisprudence, so much as the shifting of swinging blocks of voting power on
the Court itself. To say that "the Court's jury impartiality decisions
have conformed to a structural theory, through which [they can be
viewed] as a coherent body of law,"4 9 may be overstating the case. Yet
the balance seems to be a natural one; it basically follows the lines of
the pragmatic arrangement recommended by Ely in 1970.
Ely raised another argument that continues to haunt the discussion of race, especially affirmative action: "No matter how careful the
explanation that [requiring a racial cross-section on jury panels] is a
'good use of race,"' the court will be promoting the lesson that use of
race is sometimes a valid criterion of choice, a notion that stands at
odds with the principle of equality of treatment under the law. Faced
with two contradictory teachings, unequipped with the court's dexterous ability to hold them simultaneously in balance, citizens would be
"likely to listen to the voice they wish to hear." 5 This notion of the
law's pedagogical function should not be underestimated. When
courts rule on a complex and contentious legal, political, and moral issue, they send a message that will ultimately shape the habits and beliefs of the wider culture. Indeed, as Mary Ann Glendon states, there
is a "common American propensity to equate legality with morality.""1
Many such decisions set the course and tone for further civil discourse. Although these kinds of consequences are indirect and difficult to quantify, it does not make them any less real. But, it is pre48. See M. Juliet Bonazzoli, Note, Jury Selection and Bias: Debunking Invidious Stereotypes
Through Science, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 247 (1998) ("Research on the impact of juror race using both actual and mock jurors has yielded diametrically opposite findings.") Inconsistent results are also reported for the categories of gender, age, socioeconomic status, and education. Id.
at 263, passim.
49. Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory of the
ImpartialJury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1244 (1995).
50. Ely, supra note 26, at 1259.
51.

MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 269 (1994).
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cisely the continuing validity of Ely's argument that has been questioned by more recent calls for reconsideration of the crossrepresentative principle on the level of the jury itself. More specifically, the ancient practice of the mixed jury has received attention as a
potential model for addressing some contemporary problems of jury
selection. Now we must turn our attention to this model.
IV. JURIES DE MEDIETATE LINGUAE: "ANCIENT" POST-

MODERNISM
Considering the great appeal of the jury's historical pedigree, as a
right that is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," 2 perhaps the avenue of "post-modern" argument most informed by historical consciousness is that which leads back to the ancient concept of
the jury de medietate linguae, an institution dating as early as eleventhcentury England. It is worthwhile to examine this curious phenomenon in more detail, for it has exerted an increasing attraction in recent
scholarship, 3 and jurisdictions throughout the country have not been
immune to the draw of the affirmative action, race-conscious method
for jury selection. 4 These mixed juries, or juries "of half-tongue,"
seem to promise a historically-informed alternative perspective on the
problems posed by the potentially explosive combination of minority
over-representation in the class of criminal defendants, and underrepresentation on jury panels. On the other hand, restoring such a
model could just make things worse.
The jury de medietate linguae appears to have emerged in England with the influx of Jews after the transformations wrought by the
invasion of William of Normandy in the second half of the eleventh
century. Jewish money-lending invigorated and energized medieval
economic conditions. But the population of Jews also opened the
spectrum of racial tension, animosity, and violence.5" Shortly after the
accession of Richard I in 1189, anti-Semitic violence and rioting
erupted throughout the kingdom, and the king responded with a charter granting Jews who sued Christians the right to a half-Jewish jury.
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury
de Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposalfor Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777 (1994).
54. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 711 (1995)

(providing a sample of "affirmative-action jury-selection measures currently under consideration
or already in place in American jurisdictions;" the author also argues that the Hennepin County,
Minnesota use of racial quotas to select juries is constitutional.) Id. at 710-17.
55.

LEONARD B. GLICK, ABRAHAM'S HEIRS: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS IN MEDIEVAL

EUROPE 204-33 (1999).
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Questions among Jews alone were addressed in Jewish tribunals administering the lex Iudaica. Despite a series of royal legal blandishments, the Jews were finally banished from England in the summer of
1290.
With the banishment of the Jews, and the loss of their commercial expertise, came a corresponding surge of foreign merchants eager
to reap the benefits of English commercial and money-lending markets. The introduction of these alien mercantile interests assisted in
the development of the law merchant, for "the royal courts treated
' 56
English merchants as a special community with its own customs.
Thus, the mercantile community developed its own rules and procedures for adjudicating disputes; this law merchant featured the availability of juries de medietate linguae when enough of the countrymen of
the defendant were available.The custom thrived with the promulgation of special statutes authorizing mixed juries, most notably the socalled Statute of the Staple of 1353 promulgated by Edward III
While the Statute of the Staple made a mixed jury available in all pleas
appearing before the staple court, and a statute issued the following
year extended the mixed jury privilege to many other sorts of cases
and in all courts, many questions remain as to the extent of its use and
its precise workings."
Clearly, however, the mixed jury was not
merely a complex machinery for overcoming language barriers or a
cumbersome translation device. Rather, both merchant and nonmerchant cases seem to have operated on the premise that
one should be tried by those who share in a knowledge of the
practices of one's community .... Justice required ... that
members of a community following their own laws or customs
while in England be judged, at least in part, by those of their
own community and law.59

56. ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 248 (1966).

57. "The 1353 law.., provided that if a plea or debate between merchants or ministers of
the staple (or royally designated market towns) came before the mayor of the staple, to try the
truth thereof, 'if the one party and the other be a stranger, it shall be tried by strangers, and if the
one party and the other be Denizens, it shall be tried by denizens: and if the one party be denizen
and the other an alien, the one half of the inquest or of the proof shall be of denizens, and the
other half of aliens."' MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY
AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 98 (1994) [hereinafter CONSTABLE, LAW OF THE OTHER] (quoting 27 Edw. III. st.
2, c. 8, ss. 12-14).
58. Id. at 100. Constable notes a whole range of issues: "How were trials conducted? Was
the jury limited to particular issues? In what language(s) did the jurors communicate with each
other and with the court? And who counted as alien, who as denizen, for the purpose of claiming
the privilege, and again in the composition of the jury?" Id.
59. Id.at 119-20.
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The practice of juries de medietate linguae or per medietatem linguae was finally abolished by statute in the nineteenth century.
Though the legislative history of the Naturalization Act of 1870,
which did away with the institution, is somewhat threadbare, Constable makes a good case that the general feeling in Lords and Commons
centered on objections to the ancient privilege on grounds of its implications for British identity: "it is stigmatizing ourselves as a nation
very unjustly to assume that the prejudice against foreigners is such
that an alien on his trial will not have a fair trial before British subjects."6 Constable consequently sees the demise of the practice and
institution of mixed juries as the foil to a corresponding ascendancy of
the national centralized state.
Set in this light, the abstract notion of "color-blindness" appears
as a concept of relatively recent vintage in jury selection doctrine, 61 or
more theoretically, a feature of emergent positivism "in which law appears as propositional knowledge of official acts of social policy,"
eventually smothering an earlier principle of another law, a "personal
law" in which determinative emphasis was placed on "the law of the
community to which a person belongs. '62 A fuller understanding of
jury selection must therefore take account of this ancient tradition of
the mixed jury where "the judgment of a person must be according to
the law or customs of that person's community; such judgment must
be by those with knowledge of those customs or-what amounts to the
same thing-by those
who share in 'those customs and belong to the
",63
Moreover, the "essence of the practice and tradisame community.
tion of the mixed jury" lay "[i]n the gathering of the members of two
communities jointly to speak the truth of both communities. "64
More generally, Constable's analysis purports to contrast the
rich, textured diversity of a personalized practice of jury selection,
arising out of distinct communities, with the abstract, propositional,
official barrenness of current American formulations of the "fair crosssection" principle.65 In fact, even formulations that express great sympathy with the mixed jury concept do so in the "statistical" terms set
by positivism itself. These criticisms merit further consideration.
60. Id. at 145 (quoting HansardParliamentaryDebates, 3d ser., vol. 199 (1870), col. 1129.
61. Ramirez, supra note 53, at 782. See also Alschuler, supranote 54, at 742-43 (arguing
for color-conscious jury selection and acknowledging that color-blindness is an impossible goal
that is not required by the Constitution).
62. CONSTABLE, LAW OF THE OTHER, supranote 57, at 6-7.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 28-48.
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Therefore, we now turn to an examination of the interesting historical
paradigm presented by the jury de medietate linguae.
V. THE INADEQUACY OF THE MIXED JURY MODEL
A number of things can be said about the mixed-jury approach
suggested by Constable and others. First of all, it cannot be denied
that such critics are pointing to real deficiencies in our way of thinking
about juries, and to the underlying malaise, for which our unsatisfactory principles of jury selection represent only a symptom. As noted
above, the call for some form of affirmative action in jury selection,
especially with regard to the category of race, has increased in frequency in the "post-modern" era.66 Nancy King has observed that
"race-bias task forces calling for immediate reform are proliferating"
as "more and more jurisdictions adopt race-conscious procedures in
order to increase minority representation on juries. '"67 All of this
seems to come as a good faith attempt to fill a real epistemological
void. It cannot be denied that the notion of abstract juror impartiality,
the "tabula rasa" ideal, posits an impoverished account of juror
knowledge that fails to measure up to the reality of human experience. 68 No juror walks into a courtroom as a "blank slate," stripped of
any knowledge relevant to the case at hand. As Jeffrey Abramson has
observed, to the extent we are able to approximate such an "ideal," to
' the end result
fulfill our "preference for jurors with empty minds[,]" 69
of the process could hardly be given the name of justice.
Moreover, the complexity of human experience and human language makes it difficult to separate out the kinds of knowledge and experience that constitute bias from a more neutral form of knowledge
that will aid in the truth-finding process. Further, it cannot be denied
that a greater infusion of the principles of "local knowledge" and
'community"- all of those aspects of "personal law" that Constable
sees enveloped in the tradition of the jury de medietate linguae-could
provide a salutary influence on the contemporary law and practice of
jury selection. In significant measure, "the story of the mixed jury"
does demonstrate "that under state law the richness and complexity of
66. For contemporary arguments for the reinstatement of mixed juries in some form, see,
e.g., Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (1976); Daniel W.
Van Ness, Preservinga Community Voice: The Casefor Half-and -HalfJuries in Racially- Charged
Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1994); Diane Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial
Minoritieson Jury Panels,3 BLACK L.J. 80 (1973).
67. King, supra note 10, at 760-61 and n. 198.
68. See Abramson, supra note 7, at 17-55.
69. Id. at 49.
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persons and their law has given way to the sterility and fungibility of
individuals.""0 Laments over "the loss of community" form a dominant chord in the contemporary literature of the social sciences, one
that cannot be ignored. 1
Nevertheless, the dichotomies that emerge from these accounts
of the mixed jury tend to obscure rather than clarify. It seems that by
focusing with such particularity on the personality of customary law,
where in its earliest manifestations the mixed jury bubbled forth from
the community apparently in its purest form, Constable almost completely neglects the countervailing force of what she would dismiss
with the pejorative title of positivistic official law, but what Maitland
called "a wonderful system," that of the "ius commune, a common law,
of the universal church."72 Focusing on the medieval legal and social
picture in England through the prism of the early jury de medietate linguae, "as the practical embodiment of the personal law of two communities,"" leaves a distorted picture.
Dwarfing this rather obscure and ambiguous practice, in recognition of the "otherness" of their communities, of granting mixed juries
to foreigners and Jews, there had arisen a vast and complex hierarchical system rooted in the church, in the promulgation and application
of whose principles England stood not only as passive recipient, but
also as active formulator. Just like the lex mercatoria, the application
of which extended to the participants of a discrete yet international
community of actors, the canon law also represented a community of
faith extending beyond the boundaries of England to include much of
the European continent within its compass, yet a distinct community,
with its particular traditions, practices, rituals, customs, and laws. 4
The prominence of the canon law system, and its huge influence
in England at the time of the emergence of juries de medietate linguae,
70. CONSTABLE, LAW OF THE OTHER, supra note 57, at 251.
71. See, e.g., THE ESSENTIAL CIVIL SOCIETY READER (Don E. Eberly, ed., 2000); JOHN
EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999); ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000).
72. FREDERICK POLLOCK, FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1114 (Cambridge: University Press, 2nd ed. 1898).
73. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE JURY DE MEDIETATE LINGUAE: CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS OF LAW AND CITIZENSHIP 15 (1989).
74. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). Berman makes the startling assertion, for instance, that

"[B]asic institutions, concepts, and values of Western legal systems have their sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries .... Western legal
science is a secular theology, which often makes no sense because its theological presuppositions
are no longer accepted." Id. at 165.
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gives the lie to Constable's tidy historical dichotomy between personal
law and positive law, between a law based in the richness of interpersonal community, and the propositional, official law of the state. Why
indeed should there be such a cleavage, by necessity? Although the
fact that the law may be considered objective and propositional does
not obviate the element of personality, the practices and traditions of
the church and of the canon law, what Professor Harold Berman called
"the first modern Western legal system,"7 show this to be the case.
Further, by driving a wedge between the subjective and objective
dimensions of law, between personality-based and proposition-based
formulations of law, commentators like Constable risk the precipitation of further divisions. The concept of neutrality and objectivity in
the juror ultimately points to the reason for which the juror is called to
service: the exercise of his or her individual judgment on serious questions of criminal responsibility. It is almost axiomatic that the law
presupposes a link between the exercise of individual and communal
responsibility it imposes upon jurors and the individual responsibility
of the criminal defendant whose case they are adjudging. The law
rests on the premise that "determinism (the theory that all human action is compelled) is obviously incompatible with the theory of personal responsibility that underlies the criminal law."' 76 Individuals incur criminal responsibility not because they are compelled to do wrong
by the environment that surrounds them, or because of their identity
as members of a given race or ethnicity, but because they are free
moral agents who do wrong by their own choice. It is not mere indulgence in speculative alarmism to ask: what is to become of these basic
assumptions about the nature of criminal responsibility given the

75. Id. at 199. Berman convincingly argues that "not only legal thought but also the very
structure of Western legal institutions have been removed from their spiritual foundations, and
those foundations, in turn, are left devoid of the structure that once stood upon them." Id. at
198. This is the result of the development in which "it was eventually taken for granted that law,
as a product of reason, is capable of functioning as an instrument of secular power, disconnected
from ultimate values and purposes; and not only religious faith but all passionate convictions
came to be considered the private affair of each individual." Id. The argument is that it was precisely the synthesis of rigorous "propositional" systematization of the legal order with a profound
philosophical, spiritual, theological conception of the dignity of man within the framework of
God's cosmological order that marked the genius of the Western legal tradition in its early flowering.
76. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 435 (1978). This notion of
individual responsibility, lying at the heart of modem Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence,
similarly forms the backbone of democratic principles of self-government. JAMES Q. WILSON,
MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 73 [hereinafter WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT] (1997).
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changing nature of our conception of the volitional responsibility of
jurors?
These lay adjudicators receive the call to step in and exercise
critical judgment on the criminal responsibility of real defendants. If
it is necessary now to acknowledge that it is psychologically impossible
for jurors to suspend their own prejudices and biases in order to make
an objective assessment of the facts of the case, if their ultimate decisions are so rigidly determined by the idiosyncrasies of their "community," if "thinking black," for instance, requires one result, and
"thinking Hispanic" requires a different outcome, then how is it possible to limit this deterministic view of human choice to the decisions
made by jurors? If it becomes necessary to build a jury selection system around the proposition that the pervasive influence of gender,
race, ethnicity, creed or sexual orientation so shapes our thinking as to
make objective decision-making on the part of jurors an impossibility,
or a mere illusion, making the goal one of "balancing the biases," the
logic of that premise cannot help but assist in undermining the integrity of our most basic notions of criminal responsibility. 7
Shrinking the categories of human responsibility works from
both ends. The determinism that compels the "sad choices" made by
criminal defendants promotes a conception. of determinism in the decision-making processes of jurors and vice versa. The erosion of human
responsibility works simultaneously on two fronts: the "evidence"
provided in one theater assists to "prove" assertions made at the other.
This discussion should also call into question the cohesiveness of the
claim of "propositional law's" reduction and degradation of "persons"
to a "sterility and fungibility of individuals." According to the
77. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT, supra 76, passim. For a popular account of the argument containing a glossary listing of syndromes, defenses and excuses that have been recently
used by criminal defendants, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994). See also
SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1998). For a recent, notorious example, see

the arguments advanced against the criminal responsibility of the homicidal mother in Texas,
Andrea Yates. Over the period during which this article was written, Yates was tried and convicted in Houston for the murder of her five children, having methodically drowned them one by
one in the bathtub at home. The defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, citing her
history of "post-partum psychosis." Despite the sympathy her case received from various corners around the nation, especially among advocates for the mentally ill, her jury of eight women
and four men returned the guilty verdict within less than four hours and a sentence to life imprisonment in thirty-five minutes. Jim Yardley, Mother Who Drowned 5 Children In Tub Avoids
a Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2002, at Al. See also Anne Taylor Fleming, Crime
and Motherhood: Maternal Madness, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2002, at D3; Lynne Marie Kohm
and Thomas Scott Liverman, Prom Mom Killers: The Impact of Blame Shift and Distorted Statistics on Punishment for Neonaticide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 43 (2002) (discussing the
Yates case and other related trials evidencing an acceleration of the phenomenon of "blameshifting").
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"group-think" presumption, members of distinct communities or

groups all think basically the same way, making it necessary in cases
that require it for members of two communities to come together
jointly "to speak the truth of both communities." This is arguably
just as reductionistic and harmful to the integrity of "persons." It
merely homogenizes people at a different level of abstraction."
Moreover, the analysis seems to ignore the possibility that the
historical or contemporary rejection of juries de medietate linguae
might not necessarily proceed from intransigent prejudice, or systemic
bias, from gross and callous ignorance, or from a soul-destroying, atomistic positivism, but rather from the perception that real dangers
could inhere in institutionalizing group differences. It is certainly true
that "ft]he elimination of racial discrimination in our system of criminal justice is not a constitutional goal that should lightly be set
aside. 79
Still, the ameliorative powers of the law extend only so far. If in
order to eradicate, or at least maximally reduce, all invidious bias or
prejudicial taint from the operation of a judicial system, it becomes
necessary to build racial and other distinctions into the fixed structural
features of the system, 80 then it is hardly unreasonable to consider the
possibility that the price could well be too high or that the means may
be incompatible with the purposes set for them. Jeffrey Abramson re78. This seems to be the burden of Justice Thomas' warnings in the (not unrelated) voting
equality decision of Holder v. Hall:
The Court[] ...accept[s] the one underlying premise that must inform every minority vote dilution claim: the assumption that the group asserting dilution is not merely
a racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political interests as well ....
[W]e have given credence to the view that race defines political interest. We have
acted on the implicit assumption that members of racial and ethnic groups must all
think alike on important matters of public policy and must have their own 'minority
preferred' representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be considered
represented at all ....We have involved the federal courts, and indeed the Nation .... [in] an enterprise of segregating the races into political homelands that
amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid.'... The assumptions upon which our vote dilution decisions have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.
512 U.S. 874, 903-06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
79. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 503-04 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia retorted that the dissent had rolled out "the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity to racial discrimination-which will lose its intimidating effect if it continues to be fired so
randomly." Id. at 486. After all, Holland, the defendant in the case at hand, was "not a black
man, but a convicted white rapist who seeks to use the striking of blacks from his jury to overturn his conviction." Id.
80. Sheri Lynn Johnson, for example, has proposed that black, Hispanic, and Native
American defendants should be given the right to have three "racially similar" jurors on a panel
of twelve. Johnson, supra note 41, at 1695-1700.
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cently wrote about the district judge's "jurymandering" in the Crown
Heights trial:
Race and religion do matter, and the quality of deliberation is
enriched when people from different walks of life serve together
on juries. But when judges select jurors as if they are there simply to deliver the Jewish vote or the African-American vote, the
noble ideal of representative juries collapses into a vulgar invitaand ultimately
tion for jurors to be loyal to their own groups,
81
undermines all confidence in the jury system.
Indeed, it could result in an upending of the institution of the
jury itself, a result that would be contrary to the stated purposes of the
fair-cross-section ideal. With the current arrangement in which traditional minority groups are subject to under-representation in jury
pools, and on juries more specifically, the statistical disparity has led
to claims of systemic, inbuilt discrimination.8 2 The assumption, of
course, is "that gross disparities would not exist in the absence of unequal treatment."8 3 Yet "international studies have repeatedly shown
gross intergroup disparities to be commonplace all over the world,
whether in alcohol consumption, fertility rates, educational performance, or innumerable other variables."8 4 In some cases, such discrepancies may or may not be attributable to discrimination in some form.
Yet, in many other cases the disparity simply cannot be explained as
the product of discrimination."
Notwithstanding the non sequitur, academic proposals continue to
issue forth with increasing regularity, designed with the object of rectifying alleged systematic discriminatory disparities. In the context of
New Zealand, where aboriginal Maoris are underrepresented on juries
and over represented in the class of criminal defendants, it has been
argued that Maori participation in the jury process is illegitimate, because this "western" notion of adjudication runs contrary to Maori no-

81. Jeffrey Abramson, "What Makes a Jury Fair?" N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2002, at A23.
82. HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY (1993).
83. THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A
BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 35 (1995).

84. Id. (footnotes omitted).
85. Sowell provides an illuminating selected list of disparities "in which it is virtually impossible to claim that the statistical differences in question are due to discrimination." Id. Thus,
"[a] 1985 study in the United States showed that the proportion of Asian American students who
scored over 700 on the mathematics portion of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was more
than double the proportion among whites." Id. at 36.
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tions of justice and criminal responsibility. 6 Such an outcome seems
unlikely in the American context, but not unthinkable.8 7
The Maori example highlights the question: why should acknowledgement of difference, "otherness," enhance interest in the
perpetual thriving of the jury system itself? What do such "communities" have at stake in its flourishing? Perhaps the jury system does
need to go, but this is a separate question altogether. The mere fact
that the jury trial or analogous institutions are weaker, or even nonexistent, in the traditions of some minority "communities" does not
necessarily amount to an argument for abolition. Furthermore, the
exaltation of "otherness" does not necessarily issue in greater unity or
a more stable institutional integrity. The celebration of diversity may
just end in further fragmentation,88 but it does not begin to point a
feasible way to a system for which greater "buy-in" could be obtained.
Indeed, given the fact that "it is difficult to find any such [statistically]
even representation in any country or in any period of history," the
only way to ensure parity of representation would be to require "quotas or preferences to achieve an artificial statistical 'balance." 89 Surely,
political community remains an important and worthwhile goal, despite the centrifugal tensions of pluralism.9" Yet, for the reasons we
have been examining, the artificially contrived "community," achieved
by means of bureaucratic manipulation of the jury selection process,
would surely fail to do the work its promoters set for it to do.
Ultimately, the juries de medietate linguae were an accommodation to ensure that aliens would be treated fairly. Alienage seems to
86. Neil Cameron et al., The New Zealand Jury: Towards Reform, in WORLD JURY
SYSTEMS 193-97 (Neil Vidmar, ed., 2000). Thus,
[t]he institution of the jury is itself alien to Maori culture and Maori law. In its modern form, at least, it is a product of centralized, professional, and primarily retributive
justice systems. If the demand by Maori for all-Maori juries is to make any sense, it
can only do so within the context of a discrete Maori justice system-shaped and informed by Maori values and, perhaps, those European institutions that Maori regard
as appropriate or useful. It remains unclear whether the jury is likely to be one of
those.
Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
87. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Powerin the CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (arguing that the "goal [behind race-based jury nullification] is the subversion of American criminal justice.").
88. Then again, this might well be a tacit post-modernist goal, for characteristic of the
post-modernist world view is its propensity to disorient, to attack the very possibility of coherence and unity. For the post-modernist mind, reality itself is "unordered and ultimately unknowable." STEVEN BEST AND DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL
INTERROGATIONS 9 and passim (1991). See also supra note 76.
89.

THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE 36 (1999).

90. See, e.g., ELSHTAIN, supra note 22 at 30-31.
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have been determined by nation of birth, so it would be very difficult
indeed, if not impossible, to go from being an outsider to an insider.
Certainly, it would be counter-productive to recognize a principle that
stipulates only certain types of Americans are recognized as such when
it comes to putting together a jury, and that other groups must be provided for as a separate, special class.9 For all its good intentions, this
benign, remedial form of segregation could easily end up backfiring
and create deeper, more irreparable divisions. Good intentions are not
enough.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article discussed two alternate and competing notions of
jury selection and of juror knowledge, arguing that each of them is incomplete and inadequate. The problem is that both conceptions fail
to provide a complete account of juror identity and human epistemology. Jurors are neither the abstracted, context-free blank slates of the
modernist ideal, nor are they the simple ciphers of post-modern identity politics. Left with an insufficient theoretical compass, most federal and state courts have attempted to steer a middle course, trying to
avoid the extremes, and perhaps creating some awkward inconsistencies along the way. Powers and McCollum come to mind as cases in
which the Supreme Court has introduced a potentially dangerous distortion into the constitutional framework; namely, by elevating the
rights of jurors to the same level of vigorous protection accorded to
criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and
impartial jury. However, as the foregoing historical excursion demonstrates, the Supreme Court's unsteady interpolation between the requirements imposed by equal protection and by the Sixth Amendment
jury right finally achieves balance, an equilibrium that seems to be the
best available in light of the current social and political climate. This
balance prevails, for instance, in the Second Circuit's decision in the
Crown Heights case where the court refused to succumb to the alluring promise of "substantive justice" provided by racialist gerryman-

91. See Justice O'Connor's warning about the prospect of racial "balkanization" in Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993):
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society .... Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.
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dering in jury selection.92 It is a pragmatic accommodation that had
been roughly worked out in its current form well before the Court
made its pronouncements in Taylor. This suggests that the settlement
upon which the Court has landed, maintaining the cross-sectional requirement at the level of the jury pool, only as to limited categories of
race, gender and ethnicity, is more than just an artificial, ad hoc arrangement. 9 Though the Court's approach remains open to the
temptations posed by post-modernist, or subjectivist "politics of displacement,"94 it starts from a presumption of impartiality in the potential juror, rather than on the inevitability of built-in bias. It gives recognition to the importance of perspective, while, in the end, refusing
to surrender to the siren calls of group identity politics.
That such a patchwork arrangement fails to serve as the bonding
agent for a more robust form of civil society should be expected.
Thus, it would be naive to presume that, if it were possible to find the
right formula for making juries more "truly democratic," then a more
just system would be the inevitable outcome. Democratic institutions
are, after all, neutral tools and means rather than ends. The warning
of T.S. Eliot remains pertinent: "[t]he term 'democracy' ... does not
contain enough positive content to stand alone against the forces that
you dislike-it can easily be transformed by them."96
In Luis Bufiuel's cinematic satire, Le Charme discret de la bourgeoisie (1972), a series of dream sequences unfolds in which a gathering of socialites make repeatedly futile efforts to dine together. As the
film progresses, the group's attempt is thwarted at each iteration, under increasingly bizarre circumstances. In the words of one post97
modern legal theorist, "[dierision is the companion of disillusion.
Bufiuel's film skewers the emptiness and futility of his privileged
92. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 145
(2002). Hopefully the court would have reached the same result even if the proportional mix of
races in the jury pool had been the reverse of what it was in this case.
93. See Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an ImpartialityArray? A Structural Theory of
the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173 (1995) (concluding, "it is no small
measure of the Court's work in this area that its impartiality decisions, if not all of its statements
about impartiality doctrine, reveal a logical and conceptual unity").
94. For one example of the argument for "multicultural empowerment" in the context of
jury selection, see, Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
95. Thus, James Q Wilson articulates this balance, "For reasons of justice and deterrence,
the law must draw a clear line, but that line ought to reflect the most widely shared moral sentiments of the people." WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 76, at 111.
96. T.S. ELIOT, The Idea of a Christian Society, in CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE 50
(1939).

97. Anthony Carty, Introduction: Post-Modern Law, in POST-MODERN LAW:
ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN 3 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
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bourgeois protagonists. Reference to the work in the title to this Article is deliberately ironic. Presumably the purposive and wellintentioned planners of academia and government could not possibly
fall prey to the kind of fatuous vanity of Bufiuel's bourgeois socialites.
Yet, as earnest academics, lawyers, and bureaucrats search to achieve
greater degrees of fairness and justice at the level of the jury trial by
finessing a balance among the various predicted, conflicting biases of
any given jury composition, the exercise begins to suggest the contours of a similar kind of nightmarish exercise in windmill tilting.
Even accepting the premises of post-modern epistemology, the despair
of objective judgment at the individual level is not displaced by multiplying the range of shortsighted, biased perspectives. If it really is
impossible for individual jurors to rise above their various biases to
provide objective rational judgment in any given case, then multiplication of such biased perspectives around the table of deliberation will
do little to ensure a harmonious and just result. Indeed, given the
post-modern presupposition of the "incommensurability" of the
"voices" represented by disparate "communities," it is just as likely to
produce greater injustices.
Certainly, the very notion of justice, albeit flawed and imperfect,
suffers erosion alongside the corresponding diminution of agency and
responsibility. It is not necessary to embrace the notion of the modernist blank slate model to see that the required measure of objectivity
is possible, even if sometimes elusive. It defaces the dignity of human
beings, of whatever race, ethnicity, or gender, to presume human decision-making is so rigidly determined by such categories as to render all
hope of rising above the mire of subjective and myopic bias an empty
illusion. In the post-modern jury selection sequences adumbrated
here, measures ostensibly designed to bring about fairness in the individual case expand and multiply to embrace ever more extravagant
gestures in response to the protean demands of an ultimately insatiable
"subjective impartiality." Finally, there is no principled way of cabining such a concept within juridically manageable limits.9" The jury institution simply cannot bear the weight that is being placed upon it by
reformers seeking to restore civil society in the name of a post98. See WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 76, at 111 (concluding, "[a]nd why stop
with race? If race shapes our identity, so also does sex, age, wealth, and political ideology. This
implies that men cannot judge women, adults cannot judge children, the rich cannot judge the
poor, and liberals cannot judge conservatives .... For [the law] to offer more, [than 'the promise of fair treatment based on individual accountability'] whether by excusing accountability for
some people defined by their group membership or by admitting group-based stories of their
oppression, means the end of the law.").
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modernist rehabilitation of "communities of otherness." The spectacle of "otherness" can just as easily function as a fissiparous engine of
destruction. Indeed, such destruction (viz., deconstruction) and subversion have been the explicit goals of the post-modernist project.99 In
the absence of "casual public trust," Christopher Lasch has observed,
"the everyday maintenance of life has to be turned over to professional
bureaucrats.' 0 0 Yet, a reformation of civil society that is imposed
from the top down, by the bureaucratic manipulation of governmental
institutions, will be stillborn. Surely, "the atrophy of informal controls leads irresistibly to the expansion of bureaucratic controls," a development which "loads the organizational sector with burdens it cannot support." ''
It would definitely help to have a more coherent theoretical basis
for the epistemology of juror selection, and a better theoretical understanding and appreciation of the kinds of knowledge that jurors draw
upon the courtroom. Neither the "blank slate" model nor the "balance the bias" paradigm furnishes a complete, satisfactory account.
To provide such a reckoning would take the present Article far beyond
its intended limits. For now, it is clear that adjustments to the jury
system cannot be expected to repair the damage wrought by racial,
ethnic or other types of division. The sooner this is recognized, acknowledged, and accepted, the better off we all will be.

99.
100.

See, e.g., supra note 76.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF

DEMOCRACY 95, 99 (1995).
101. Id.

